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 Abstract 
The average Latin American country produces about 1 fifth of the output per worker of the US. What 
are the sources of these enormous income gaps? I report development-accounting results for Latin 
America. On average Latin America’s overall physical and human capital endowment relative to the 
USA is essentially identical to Latin America’s efficiency relative to the USA . In my main sample 
average relative capital and average relative efficiency are both roughly double actual average relative 
incomes. Hence, both capital gaps and efficiency gaps are very large: the average Latin American 
country has less than half the capital (human and physical) per worker of the US, and uses it less than 
half as efficiently. In assessing this evidence, it is essential to bear in mind that efficiency gaps 
contribute to income disparity both directly -- as they mean that Latin America gets less out of its 
capital -- and indirectly -- since much of the capital gap itself is likely due to diminished incentives to 
invest in equipment, structure, schooling, and health caused by low efficiency. The consequences of 
closing the efficiency gap would correspondingly be far reaching. Explaining the Latin American 
efficiency gap is therefore a high priority both for scholars and for policy makers.  
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1 Introduction
The average Latin American country produces about 1 fth of the output per worker
of the US. What are the sources of these enormous income gaps? This paper reports
development-accounting results for Latin America. Development accounting compares
di¤erences in income per worker between developing and developed countries to counter-
factual di¤erences attributable to observable components of physical and human capital.
Such calculations can serve a useful preliminary diagnostic role before engaging in deeper
and more detailed explorations of the fundamental determinants of di¤erences in income
per worker. If di¤erences in physical and human capital or capital gaps are su¢ cient to
explain most of the di¤erence in incomes, then researchers and policy makers need to focus
on factors holding back investment (in machines and in humans). Instead, if di¤erences in
capital are insu¢ cient to account for most of the variation in income, one must conclude
that developing countries are also hampered by relatively low e¢ ciency at using their
inputs - e¢ ciency gaps. The research and policy agenda would then have to focus on
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technology, allocative e¢ ciency, competition, and other determinants of the e¢ cient use
of capital.1
1For a detailed exposition of development accounting see, among others, Caselli (2005).
I present development-accounting results for 2005 for three samples of Latin American
countries: a broadsample of 22 countries, a narrowsample of 9, and an intermediate
sample of 15.
The three samples di¤er in the data available to measure human capital. In the broad
sample human capital is measured in the context of a Mincerianframework, where the
key inputs are schooling (years of education) and health (as proxied by the adult survival
rate). In the narrow and intermediate samples I augment the Mincerian framework with
measures of cognitive skills, to account for additional factors such as schooling quality,
parental inputs, and other inuences on human capital not captured by years of schooling
and health. The measures of cognitive skills are based on tests administered to school-age
children. In the narrow sample, the test is a science test whose results are directly compa-
rable between Latin America and the benchmark developed country. In the intermediate
sample the tests were only administered in Latin America and can be compared to the
benchmark country only on the basis of a number of ad hoc assumptions.
In all three samples I measure physical capital as an aggregate of reproducible and
naturalcapital. Reproducible capital includes equipment and structures, while natural
capital primarily includes subsoil resources, arable land, and timber.
Given measures of physical capital gaps, as well gaps in the components of human
capital, development-accounting uses a calibration to map these gaps into counter-factual
income gaps, or the income gaps that would be observed based on di¤erences in human and
capital endowments only. Because these counterfactual incomes are bundles of physical
and human capital, I refer to the ratio of Latin American counterfactual incomes to the
US counterfactual income as relative capital.
For each of the three samples I present results from two alternative calibrations, a
baselinecalibration and an aggressivecalibration. The baseline calibration makes use
of the existing body of microeconomic estimates of the Mincerian framework in the way that
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most closely ts the theoretical framework of development accounting. As it turns out, this
leads to coe¢ cients for the components of human capital that are substantially lower than
in much existing work in development accounting - leading to relatively smaller estimated
capital gaps and, correspondingly, larger e¢ ciency gaps. The aggressive calibration thus
uses more conventional gures as a robustness check.
When I use my benchmark calibration, irrespective of sample/cognitive skill correction,
I nd that relative capital and relative e¢ ciencies are almost identical. For example in
the broad sample average relative capital and average relative e¢ ciency are both 44% - or
roughly double actual average relative incomes. Hence, both capital gaps and e¢ ciency
gaps are very large: the average Latin American country has less than half the capital
(human and physical) per worker of the US, and uses it less than half as e¢ ciently.
Using the aggressive calibration, capital gaps are naturally larger, and e¢ ciency gaps
correspondingly smaller. Nevertheless, even under this best-case scenario for the view
that capital gaps are the key source of income gaps, average Latin American e¢ ciency is
at most 60% of the US level, still implying a vast e¢ ciency gap.
In assessing this evidence, it is essential to bear in mind that e¢ ciency gaps contribute
to income disparity both directly as they mean that Latin America gets less out of its
capital and indirectly since much of the capital gap itself is likely due to diminished
incentives to invest in equipment, structure, schooling, and health caused by low e¢ ciency.
The consequences of closing the e¢ ciency gap would correspondingly be far reaching.
Explaining the Latin American e¢ ciency gap is therefore a high priority both for schol-
ars and for policy makers. It is likely that this task will require rm-level evidence. Firm
level evidence would also be invaluable in checking the robustness of the development-
accounting results, which are subject to severe data-quality limitations.
2 Conceptual Framework
The analytical tool at the core of development accounting is the aggregate production func-
tion. The aggregate production function maps aggregate input quantities into output. The
main inputs considered are physical capital and human capital. The empirical literature
so far has failed to uncover compelling evidence that aggregate input quantities deliver
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large external economies, so it is usually deemed safe to assume constant returns to scale.2
Given this assumption, one can express the production function in intensive form, i.e. by
specifying all input and output quantities in per worker terms. In order to construct coun-
terfactual incomes a functional form is needed. Existing evidence suggests that the share
of capital in income does not vary systematically with the level of development, or with
factor endowments [Gollin (2002)]. Hence, most practitioners of development accounting
opt for a Cobb-Douglas specication. In sum, the production function for country i is
yi = Aik

i h
1 
i ; (1)
where y is output per worker, k is physical capital per worker, h is human capital per
worker (quality-adjusted labor), and A captures unmeasured/unobservable factors that
contribute to di¤erences in output per worker.
The term A is subject to much speculation and controversy. Practitioners refer to it as
total factor productivity, technology, a measure of our ignorance, etc. Here I will refer to
it as e¢ ciency. Countries with a larger A are countries that, for whatever reasons, are
more e¢ cient users of their physical and human capital.
The goal of development accounting is to assess the relative importance of e¢ ciency
di¤erences and physical and human capital di¤erences in producing the di¤erences in
income per worker we observe in the data. To this end, one constructs counterfactual
incomes, or capital bundles,
~yi = k

i h
1 
i ; (2)
which are based exclusively on the observable inputs. Di¤erences in these capital bundles
are then compared to income di¤erences. If counter-factual and actual income di¤erences
are similar, then observable factors are able to account for the bulk of the variation in
income. If they are quite di¤erent, then di¤erences in e¢ ciency are important. Establishing
how signicant e¢ ciency di¤erences are has important repercussions both for research and
for policy.
2See, e.g. Iranzo and Peri (2009) for a recent review and some new evidence on the quantitative
signicance of schooling externalities.
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In order to construct the counterfactual ~ys we need to construct measures of ki and
hi, as well as to calibrate the capital-share parameter . Standard practice sets the latter
to 0.33, and we stick to this practice throughout. Caselli (2005) shows that development-
accounting calculations are not overly sensitive to alternative values in a reasonable range.
The rest of this section focuses on the measurement of physical and human capital.3
Existing development-accounting calculations measure k exclusively on the basis of
reproducible capital (equipment and structures). But in most developing countries, where
agricultural and mining activities still represent large shares of GDP, natural capital (land,
timber, ores, etc.) is also very important. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) show that omitting
natural capital can lead to very signicant understatements of total capital in developing
countries relative to developed ones. Hence, this study will measure k as the sum of the
value of all reproducible and natural capital.
Human capital per worker can vary across countries as a result of di¤erences in knowl-
edge, skills, health, etc. The literature has identied three variables that vary across
countries which may capture signicant di¤erences in these dimensions: years of schooling
[e.g., Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999)], health [Weil (2007)], and
cognitive skills [e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann (2012a)]. In order to bring these together,
we postulate the following model for human capital:
hi = exp(ssi + rri + tti): (3)
In this equation, si measures average years of schooling in the working-age population,
ri is a measure of health in the population, and ti is a measure of cognitive skills. The
coe¢ cients s, r, and t map di¤erences in the corresponding variables into di¤erences
in human capital.4
The model in (3) is attractive because it o¤ers a strategy for calibration of the para-
3There may well be signicant heterogeneity among Latin American countries, and, more importantly,
between Latin America and the benchmark rich country, in the value of . However, it is not known how
to perform development-accounting with country-specic capital shares. This is because measures of the
capital stock are indices, so that a requirement for the exercise to make sense is that the results should be
invariants to the units in which k is measured. Now (ki=kj)
 is unit-invariant, but
 
kii =k
j
j

is not.
4Some caveats as to the validity of of the functional form assumption in (3) are in order. There
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meters s, r, and t. In particular, combining (1), (3), and an assumption of perfect
competition in labor markets, we obtain the Mincerianformulation
log(wij) = i + ssij + rrij + ttij; (4)
where wij (sij; etc.) is the wage (years of schooling, etc.) of worker j in country i, and
i is a country-specic term. This suggests that using within-country variation in wages,
schooling, health, and cognitive skills one might in principle identify the coe¢ cients .
In practice, there are severe limitations in following this strategy, that we discuss after
introducing the data.
3 Data
We work with three samples, broad, narrow, and intermediate. The broad data set contains
all Latin American countries for which we have data for y, k, s, and r, all observed in 2005.
There are 22 such countries (excluded are Barbados, Cuba, and Paraguay, for which we
have no capital data). The other two samples add alternative measures of t. The trade-o¤
is that one measure o¤ers a more credible comparison with the benchmark high-income
country, but is only available for 9 Latin-American economies. The more dubious but more
plentiful measure is available for 15 countries. All but one of the countries in the narrow
sample are also in the intermediate sample (Trinidad and Tobago is the exception). The
dataset also includes data from the USA, which we use as the benchmark rich country.
Per-worker income yi is variable rgdpwok from version 7.1 of the Penn World Tables
(PWT71). Figure 1 shows per-worker income in each country in the broad sample relative
to the USA, or yi=yUS. Countries that are also included in the narrow sample are in black,
and countries that are in the intermediate but not the narrow sample are in grey. With the
exception of Trinidad and Tobago, all Latin America countries have per-worker incomes
is considerable micro and macro evidence against the assumption that workers wiith di¤erent years of
schooling are perfect substitutes [e.g. Caselli and Coleman (2006)]. In this paper I abstract from the issue
of imperfect substitutability. Caselli and Ciccone (2013) argue that consideration of imperfect substitution
is unlikely to reduce the estimated importance of e¢ ciency gaps.
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Figure 1: Income per worker relative to the US
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White bars; only broad sample. Grey bars: only broad and intermediate samples. Black bars: all samples (except TTO not
in intermediate). Dashed line: broad sample mean. Light solid line: intermediate sample mean. Heavy solid line: narrow
sample mean. Source: PWT71.
well below 40% of the US level, sometimes much below. The horizontal lines show the
three (unweighted) sample averages, indicating that the average country is only one fth
as productive as the USA.5
World Bank (2012) presents cross-sectional estimates of the total capital stock, k, as
well as its components, for various years. The total capital stock includes reproducible
capital, but also land, timber, mineral deposits, and other items that are not included in
standard national-account-based data sets. The basic strategy of the World Bank team
that constructed these data begins with estimates of the rental ows accruing from di¤erent
types of natural capital, which are then capitalized using xed discount rates. I construct
the total capital measure by adding the variables producedplusurban and natcap.
Figure 2 shows total (reproducible plus natural) capital per worker estimates for Latin
American countries relative to the US, ki=kUS. The average Latin American worker is
endowed with approximately one fth of the physical capital of the average US worker.
5In the narrow sample the average is higher due to the disproportionate weight of Trinidad and Tobago.
Labor-force weighted averages are reported in Table 1 below.
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Figure 2: Physical capital per worker relative to the US
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White bars; only broad sample. Grey bars: only broad and intermediate samples. Black bars: all samples (except TTO not
in intermediate). Dashed line: broad sample mean. Light solid line: intermediate sample mean. Heavy solid line: narrow
sample mean. Source: World Bank (2012).
For average years of schooling in the working-age population (which is dened as be-
tween 15 and 99 years of age) I rely on Barro and Lee (2013). Note from equation (3)
that for the purposes of constructing relative human capital hi=hUS what is relevant is the
di¤erence in years of schooling si  sUS. The same will be true for r and t. Accordingly, in
Figure 3 I plot schooling-year di¤erences with the USA in 2005. Latin American workers
have always at least three year less schooling than American ones, and ve on average.
As a proxy for the health status of the population, r, Weil (2007) proposes using
the adult survival rate. The adult survival rate is a statistic computed from age-specic
mortality rates at a point in time. It can be interpreted as the probability of reaching
the age of 60, conditional on having reached the age of 15, at current rates of age-specic
mortality. Since most mortality before age 60 is due to illness, the adult survival rate is a
reasonably good proxy for the overall health status of the population at a given point in
time. Relative to more direct measures of health, the advantage of the adult survival rate is
that it is available for a large cross-section of countries. I construct the adult survival rate
from the World Banks World Development Indicators. Specically, this is the weighted
average of male and female survival rates, weighted by the male and female share in the
population.
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Figure 3: Di¤erences in years of schooling with the US
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
Di
ffe
ren
ce
s i
n y
ea
rs 
of 
sc
ho
oli
ng
 w
ith
 th
e U
S
GT
M HT
I
NI
C
VE
N
HN
D
DO
M
CO
L
BR
A
SL
V
EC
U
UR
Y
CR
I
ME
X
PE
R
GU
Y
AR
G
PA
N
TT
O
BO
L
BL
Z
JA
M
CH
L
White bars; only broad sample. Grey bars: only broad and intermediate samples. Black bars: all samples (except TTO not
in intermediate). Dashed line: broad sample mean. Light solid line: intermediate sample mean. Heavy solid line: narrow
sample mean. Source: Barro and Lee (2013).
In Figure 4 I plot adult survival rate di¤erences with the USA. Survival rate probabil-
ities are lower in Latin America than in the US, but perhaps not vastly so. On average,
Latin American 15-year olds are only 4 percentage points less likely to reach the age of 60
than US 15-year olds.6
Following work by Gundlach, Rudman, andWoessman (2002), Woessman (2003), Jones
and Schneider (2010) and Hanushek and Woessmann (particularly 2012a), we also wish to
account for di¤erences in cognitive skills not already accounted for by years of schooling
and health. The ideal measure would be a test of average cognitive ability in the working
population. Hanushek and Zhang (2009) report estimates of one such test for a dozen
countries, the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS), but only one of these is in
Latin America (Chile).
As a fallback, I rely on internationally comparable test scores taken by school-age
children. In the narrow sample, I will use scores from a science test administered in 2009
6The population-weighted mean survival rate in the broad sample is 0.85.
9
Figure 4: Di¤erences in survival rate with the US
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White bars; only broad sample. Grey bars: only broad and intermediate samples. Black bars: all samples (except TTO not
in intermediate). Dashed line: broad sample mean. Light solid line: intermediate sample mean. Heavy solid line: narrow
sample mean. Source: WDI.
to 15 year olds by PISA (Program for International Student Assessment). There are in
principle several other internationally-comparable tests (by subject matter, year of testing,
and organization testing) that could be used in alternative to or in combination with the
2009 PISA science test. However there would be virtually no gain in country coverage by
using or combining with other years (the PISA tests of 2009 are the ones with the greatest
participation, and virtually no Latin American country participated in other worldwide
tests and not in the 2009 PISA tests).7 Focusing only on one test bypasses potentially
thorny issues of aggregation across years, subjects, and methods of administration. Cross-
country correlations in test results are very high anyway, and very stable over time.8 Data
on PISA test score results are from the World Banks Education Statistics.
Aside from the world-wide tests of cognitive skills used in the narrow sample, there are
7The only exception is Belize, which participated in some of the reading tests admninistered by PIRLS
(Progress in International Reading Literacy Study).
8Repeating all my calculations using the PISA math scores yielded results that were virtually indistin-
guishable from those using the science test.
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also two regionaltests of cognitive skills that have been administered to a group of Latin
American countries: the rst in 1997 by the Laboratorio Latinoamericano de Evaluación
de la Calidad de la Educación (LLECE), covering reading and math in the third and fourth
grade; the second in 2006 by the Latin American bureau of the UNESCO, covering the
same subjects in third and sixth grade. These tests are described in greater detail in, e.g.,
Hanushek and Woessman (2012a), who also argue that these tests may better reect within
Latin-American di¤erences in cognitive skills.
From the perspective of this study, the main attraction of these alternative measures
of cognitive skills is that they cover a signicantly larger sample. The biggest problem,
of course, is that they exclude the United States (or any high-income country) and so, on
the face of it, they are unusable for constructing counterfactual relative incomes. However,
Hanushek and Woessman (2012a) propose a methodology to splice the regional scores
into their worldwide sample. While this splicing involves a large number of assumptions
that are di¢ cult to evaluate, it is worthwhile to assess the robustness of my results to these
data.9
Needless to say measuring t by the above-described test scores is clearly very unsatis-
factory, as in most cases the tests reect the cognitive skills of individuals who have not
joined the labor force as of 2005, much less those of the average worker. The average Latin
American worker in 2005 was 36 years old, so to capture their cognitive skills we would
need test scores from 1984.10 Implicitly, then, we are interpreting test-score gaps in current
children as proxies for test scores gaps in current workers. If Latin America and the US
have experienced di¤erent trends in cognitive skills of children since 1984 this assumption
is problematic.
The 2009 PISA science tests are reported on a scale from 0 to 1000, and they are nor-
malized so that the average score among OECD countries (i.e. among all pupils taking the
test in this set of countries) is (approximately) 500 and the standard deviation is (approxi-
9Hanushek and Woessman (2012a) splice the regional scores into world-wide scores that are themselves
aggregates of multiple waves and multiple subject areas - obtained with a methodology described in
Hanushek and Woessman (2012b).
10The method for estimating the average age of workers is described in footnote 25 of Caselli (2005).
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Figure 5: Di¤erences in test scores with the US
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Grey bars: regional test/intermediate sample. Black bars: PISA test/narrow sample. Light solid line: regional-test mean.
Heavy solid line: PISA-test mean. Source: World Banks Education Statistics and Hanushek and Woessman (2012a, 2012b).
mately) 100.11 The regional scores are put on the PISA scale by Hanushek andWoessmans
splicing, so they can be directly compared. Figure 5 shows test score di¤erences ti   tUS
for the narrow and intermediate samples. Di¤erences in PISA scores are very signicant:
the average Latin American student in 2009 shows cognitive skills that are below those
of his US counterpart by about one standard deviation of the OECD distribution of cog-
nitive skills. Only Chile is a partial stand-out, with a cognitive gap closer to one half of
one standard deviation. Di¤erences in Hanushek and Woessmans spliced regional tests
are even more signicant, with the average gap exceeding 1.5 standard deviations. Recall
that the PISA scores are directly comparable between Latin American and USA, while
11I say approximately in parenthesis because the normalization was applied to the 2006 wave of the
test. The 2009 test was graded to be comparable to the 2006 one. Hence, it is likely that the 2009 mean
(standard deviation) will have drifted somewhat away from 500 (100) - though probably not by much. The
PISA math and reading tests were normalized in 2000 and 2003, respectively, so their mean and standard
deviation are more likely to have drifted away from the initial benchmark. This is one reason why I use
the science test for my baseline calculations.
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the spliced regional tests while arguably giving a more accurate sense of within Latin
America di¤erences are less suitable for poor country-rich country comparisons. Hence,
the discrepancy in cognitive-skill gaps between the PISA and the regional scores implies
that the latter should be treated with caution.
4 Calibration
The last, and most di¢ cult, step in producing counter-factual income gaps between US
and Latin America is to calibrate the coe¢ cients s, r, and t. As discussed, equation
(4) indicates that, using within country data on w, s, r, and t, one could in principle
identify these coe¢ cients by running an extended Mincerian regression for log-wages. In
implementing this plan, we are confronted with (at least) two important problems.
The rst problem is that one of the explanatory variables, the adult survival rate
r, by denition does not vary within countries. Estimating r directly is therefore a
logical impossibility. To solve this problem Weil (2007) notices that, in the time series
(for a sample of ten countries for which the necessary data is available), there is a fairly
tight relationship between the adult survival rate and average height. In other words, he
postulates ci = c+cri, where ci is average height and the coe¢ cient c is estimated from
the above-mentioned time series relation (he obtains a coe¢ cient of 19.2 in his preferred
specication). Since height does vary within countries as well as between countries, this
opens the way to identifying r by means of the Mincerian regression
log(wij) = i + ssij + ccij + ttij;
where r = cc.
12
The second problem is that measures of t are not consistent at the macro and at the
micro level. In particular, while we do have micro data sets reporting both results from
tests of cognitive skills and wages, the test in question is simply a di¤erent test from the
tests we have available at the level of the cross-section of countries. Call the alternative test
12Needless to say if we had cross-country data on average height there would be no need to use the
survival rate at all.
13
available at the micro level d. Once again the solution is to assume a linear relationship
di = dti. The di¤erence with the case of height-survival rate is that, as far as I know, there
is no way to check the empirical plausibility of this assumption. Given the assumed linear
relationship, one can back out d as the ratio of the within country standard deviation of
dij and tij. With d at hand, one can back out t from the modied Mincerian regression
log(wij) = i + ssij + ccij + ddij; (5)
using t = dd.
In choosing values for s, c, and d from the literature it is highly desirable to focus on
microeconomic estimates of equation (5) that include all three right-hand variables. This
is because s, c, and d are well-known to be highly positively correlated.13 Hence, any OLS
estimate of one of the coe¢ cients from a regression that omits one or two of the other two
variables will be biased upward.14
A search of the literature yielded one and only one study reporting all three coe¢ cients
from equation (5). Vogl (2014) uses the two waves (2002 and 2005) of the nationally-
representative Mexican Family Life Survey to estimate (5) on a subsample of men aged
25-65. In his study, w is measured as hourly earnings, s as years of schooling, c is in
centimeters, and d is the respondents score on a cognitive-skill test administered at the
time of the survey.15 The cognitive skill measure is scaled so its standard deviation in the
Mexican population is 1.16
The coe¢ cients reported by Vogl are as follows (see his Table 4, column 7). The return
to schooling s is 0.072, which can be plugged directly in equation (3). The return to
heightc is 0.013. Hence, the coe¢ cient associated with the adult survival rate in (3)
13See, e.g., the literature review in Vogl (2014).
14An alternative would be to use IV estimates of the s, but instruments for the variables on the right
hand side of equation 5 are often somewhat controversial - especially for height and cognitive skills.
15The test is the short-form Ravens Progressive Matrices Test.
16Needless to say there are aspects of Vogls treatment that imply the regressions he runs are not a
perfect t for the conceptual framework of the paper. It may have been preferable for our pusposes to
include both men and women. He also controls for ethnicity, age, and age squared, which do not feature
in my framework. Finally, he notes that the Ravens core is a coarse measure of cognitive skills, giving
raise to concerns with attenuation bias (more on this below).
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is 0.013 x 19.2 = 0.25, where I have used Weils mapping between height and the adult
survival rate. Finally, the reported return to cognitive skills d is 0.011. Since the standard
deviation of d is one by construction, and the standard deviation of the 2009 Science PISA
test in Mexico is 77, the implied coe¢ cient on the PISA test for the purposes of constructing
h is 0.011/77=0.00014.17
The coe¢ cients in my baseline calibration are considerably lower than those used in
other development-accounting exercises. For schooling, applications usually gravitate to-
wards the modalMincerian coe¢ cient of 0.10. For the adult survival rate, Weil (2007)
uses 0.65, on the basis of considerably higher estimates of the returns to height than those
reported by Vogl. For the return to cognitive skills, Hanushek and Woessmann (2012a)
advocate 0.002, which is more than one order of magnitude larger than the value I derive
from the Vogls estimates.18
The fact that the parameters calibrated on Vogls estimates are smaller than those
commonly used is consistent with the discussion above. In particular, the alternative
estimates are often based on regressions that omit one or two of the variables in (5), and
are therefore upward biased. Another consideration is that there is considerable cross-
country heterogeneity in the estimates, and that researchers often focus on estimates from
the USA, which are often larger.19 ;20
17Hanushek and Woessmans splicing procedure implies that the same coe¢ cient can be used for the
regional tests used in the intermediate sample.In particular, the relevant standard error is the average of
the standard deviations of Pisa science and math tests in Mexico, which is 80. Then we have 0.011/80 =
0.00014.
18This is based on Hanushek and Zhang (2009), who use the International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS)
to estimate the return to cognitive skills in a set of 13 countries. The value of 0.002 is the one for the
USA.
19For example, in Hanushek and Zhang (2009), the estimated market return to cognitive skills varies
(from minimum to maximum) by a factor of 10! The estimate from the USA, which is used in Hanushek
and Woessman (2012a) is the maximum of this distribution.
20This is actually an issue with the capital share  as well. However, the issue there is less severe as
observed capital shares do not vary systematically with y, so it should be possible to ascribe the observed
variation to measurement error. In other words the patterns of variation in  do not necessarily rise the
issue of model mispecication.
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On the other hand, Vogls regressions are admittedly estimated via OLS, and there
is a real concern with attenuation bias from measurement error. In order to gauge the
sensitivity of my results to possibly excessively low values of the calibration parameters
due to attenuation bias, I will also present results based on an aggressive calibration,
which uses a Mincerian return of 0.10, Weils 0.65 value for the mapping of the adult
survival rate to human capital, and Hanushek and Woessmans 0.002 coe¢ cient on the
PISA test.21
Figure 6: Human capital per worker relative to the US - baseline calibration
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Overall height: relative human capital per worker without cognitive-skill correction. Grey (Black) bars: relative human
capital per worker with cognitive-skill correction based on regional (PISA) tests. Dashed line: average with no cognitive-skill
correction. Light (heavy) solid line: average with regional-(PISA-)test correction.
Figure 6 shows human-capital per worker estimates for Latin American countries rel-
ative to the US, hi=hUS, under my baseline calibration. The full height of the bar shows
21As described above the Hanushek and Zhang estimate for the US comes from a test d di¤erent from t.
In order to go from their coe¢ cient d to the coe¢ cient of interest t we need to multiply the former by
the ratio of the standard deviation of dUS;i to the standard deviation of tUS;i. Since Hanushek and Zhang
standardize the variable d, we just have to multiply by the inverse of the standard deviation of tUS;i. But
in the test we are using this is just 0.98, so the correction would be immaterial.I use the same value both
in the narrow and in the intermediate sample.
16
the value of hi=hUS when excluding cognitive skills, and is thus fully comparable across
all countries in the gure. The solid bars are the values when including cognitive skills.
Irrespective of sample and cognitive-skill correction the average Latin American worker is
endowed with approximately 70% of the human capital of the average US worker.
Figure 7: Human capital per worker relative to the US - aggressive calibration
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Overall height: relative human capital per worker without cognitive-skill correction. Grey (Black) bars: relative human
capital per worker with cognitive-skill correction based on regional (PISA) tests. Dashed line: average with no cognitive-skill
correction. Light (heavy) solid line: average with regional-(PISA-)test correction.
Figure 7 is analogous to Figure 6 but shows the aggressive calibration instead. Not
Surprisingly, using the aggressive calibration results in signicantly lower relative human
capital for Latin America, since the impact of di¤erentials in schooling, health, and cogni-
tive skills is magnied. Human capital gaps become particularly large when including the
cognitive-skill corrections.
5 Results
5.1 Baseline Calibration
In the large sample we lack cognitive skill information for more than half of the countries,
so we set t = 0. Figure 8 shows each countrys counterfactual income relative to the US
(relative capital) in 2005, ~yi=~yUS, as well as the relative incomes yi=yUS already shown in
17
Figure 8: Relative capital, baseline calibration, no cognitive-skill correction
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Overall height: relative capital per worker. Grey bars: relative income per worker. Dashed line: broad sample mean. Light
solid line: intermediate sample mean. Heavy solid line: narrow sample mean.
Figure 1. In particular, for each country the overall height of the bar is relative capital,
while the height of the shaded bar is relative income.
As is apparent, there is a lot of variation in relative capital, ranging from 20% to
almost 70%. This reects considerable heterogeneity in rates of physical and human-
capital accumulation among Latin American countries, as seen above. Sample means are
between 44% (broad and intermediate sample) and 49% (narrow sample). This means that
observed distributions of physical and human capital are consistent with Latin American
workers being between 44 and 49% as productive as USA ones. We can interpret this
measure as a measure of the capital gap between Latin America and the US.
In Figure 9 we extend our calculations to include information on cognitive skills based
on worldwide PISA test scores. The sample size correspondingly drops to 9 countries.
The e¤ect of including cognitive skills under my baseline calibration is virtually nil: the
mean remains unchanged at 0.49. This result is expected given the very small calibrated
loading on cognitive skills implied by Vogls estimates. Very similar patterns emerge
when using the regional scores/intermediate sample, as seen in Figure 10.
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Figure 9: Relative capital, baseline calibration, PISA cognitve skills
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Overall height: relative capital per worker. Grey bars: relative income per worker. Solid line: mean.
5.2 AggressiveCalibration
My baseline calibration uses coe¢ cients for mapping years of schooling, health, and cog-
nitive skills into human capital that, taken individually, are lower than those presented
in other contributions. In this section I explore the robustness to my results to more
commonly-used values. Hence, I set s = 0:10, r = 0:65, and t = 0:002.
Results from the large sample using this aggressive calibration are shown in Figure 11.
Given the larger coe¢ cients, counterfactual incomes are necessarily smaller than under the
baseline calibration. Yet quantitatively the di¤erence is not very large. Average relative
capital drops to 40%, so still roughly double relative income.
Figure 12 shows the results from the aggressive calibration using the PISA test scores.
Including cognitive skills in the calculation of relative capital has a much bigger impact
than under the baseline, because the coe¢ cient on cognitive skills is an order of magnitude
larger. The average counterfactual relative income falls to 40%, compared with 49% in the
baseline calibration (within the same narrow sample). This is a large gain in explanatory
power of observables. For many countries, the gap between relative income and relative
capital shrinks considerably.
Finally, Figure 13 reports the results from the aggressive calibration when using the
19
Figure 10: Relative capital, baseline calibration, regional-testcognitive skills
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Overall height: relative capital per worker. Grey bars: relative income per worker. Solid line: mean.
regional test scores. Recall that these tests tend to show even larger cognitive gaps with
the US. Correspondingly, using these tests in combination with the aggressive calibration
leads to an even better alignment between relative capital and relative income.
6 Implications for E¢ ciency Gaps
We have seen that, depending on cognitive skill correction, counterfactual income ratios
(relative capital) in Latin America tend to be much larger than actual income ratios. This
discrepancy implies that Latin America su¤ers from an e¢ ciency gap as much as it su¤ers
from a capital gap.
We can quantify e¢ ciency gaps by noting, from (1) and (2), that
Ai
AUS
=
yi=yUS
~yi=~yUS
:
Hence, Latin American e¢ ciency gaps can be directly gleaned from Figures (8)-(13) by
simply dividing the height of the shaded bars by the overall height of the bars.
In Table 1 I report the sample averages of the implied e¢ ciency gaps, for the vari-
ous cognitive skill correction - calibration combinations. For completeness I also report
20
Figure 11: Relative capital, aggressive calibration, no cognitive-skill correction
0
.2
.4
.6
Co
un
ter
fac
tua
l a
nd
 ac
tua
l re
lat
ive
 in
co
me
HT
I
NI
C
SL
V
GT
M
DO
M
CO
L
HN
D
BO
L
PE
R
UR
Y
BR
A
CR
I
JA
M
PA
N
AR
G
GU
Y
EC
U
ME
X
VE
N
BL
Z
CH
L
TT
O
Overall height: relative capital per worker. Grey bars: relative income per worker. Dashed line: broad sample mean. Light
solid line: intermediate sample mean. Heavy solid line: narrow sample mean.
the corresponding averages for relative income and relative capital, as well as labor-force
weighted means.
Using the baseline calibration, average relative capital and average relative e¢ ciency
are almost identical, irrespective of sample/cognitive skill correction/weighting. One way
to put this is that capital gaps and e¢ ciency gaps contribute equally to Latin American
income gaps. When using the aggressive calibration, the relative importance of capital
gaps increases, particularly when adding the cognitive-skill corrections. Still, even under
the most aggressive scenario average Latin American relative e¢ ciency is only 60% of US
e¢ ciency.22
In order to fully appreciate the importance of these e¢ ciency gaps it is crucial to note
that, under almost any imaginable set of circumstances, physical (specically, reproducible)
and human capital accumulation respond to a countrys level of e¢ ciency. The higher A
22In the narrow sample it is probably best to focus on the labor-force weighted results, as the unweighted
ones give disproportionate weight to Trinidad and Tobago.
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Figure 12: Relative capital, aggressive calibration, PISA cognitive skills
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Overall height: relative capital per worker. Grey bars: relative income per worker. Solid line: mean.
the higher the marginal productivity of capital, leading to enhanced incentives to invest
in equipment and structure, schooling, etc. While quantifying this e¤ect is di¢ cult, most
theoretical frameworks would lead one to expect it to be large. Hence, it is legitimate to
conjecture that a signicant fraction of the capital gap may be due to the e¢ ciency gap.23
7 Implications and Conclusions
There is a large gap in income per worker between Latin America and the USA: Latin
American workers are only about one fth as productive as workers from the United
States. A development-accounting calculation reveals that both capital gaps and e¢ ciency
gaps contribute to this overall productivity gap. In particular, a Cobb-Douglas aggregate
23In principle, one might also argue for a reverse direction of causation, with larger physical and human-
capital stocks leading to higher e¢ ciency. In particular, this would be true if the model was misspecied,
and there were large externalities. But as already mentioned the empirical literature has not to date
uncovered signicant evidence of externalities in physical and human capital.
22
Figure 13: Relative capital, aggressive calibration, regional-testcognitive skills
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Overall height: relative capital per worker. Grey bars: relative income per worker. Solid line: mean.
of observable physical and human capital per worker is roughly in the order of 40% on
average of the corresponding US level (capital gap)  implying that the e¢ ciency with
which inputs are used in Latin America is in the order of 50% of US levels (e¢ ciency gap).
Reducing this e¢ ciency gap would reduce the overall productivity gap both directly, by
allowing Latin America to reap greater benets from its physical and human capital, and
indirectly, since much of the capital gap is likely due to the e¢ ciency gap itself: closing
the e¢ ciency gap would stimulate investment at rates potentially capable of closing the
capital gap as well.
These conclusions are contingent on the quality of the underlying macroeconomic data.
There is growing concern about the quality and reliability of the PPP national-account
gures in the Penn World Tables and similar data sets [e.g. Johnson et al. (2013)]. Similar
concerns apply, no doubt, to our proxies for human capital as well (as already discussed
particularly in the context of cognitive skills). It is true that such concerns are most often
voiced in the context of implied comparisons of changes, especially over short time spans:
cross-country comparisons of levels reveal such gigantic di¤erences (as seen above) that
they seem unlikely to be entirely dominated by noise. Still, exclusive reliance on these
macro data is highly inadvisable.
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Table 1: Summary of Results
Calibration
Baseline Aggressive
Sample/Cognitive Skill Measure Relative Relative Relative Relative Relative
GDP Capital E¢ ciency Capital E¢ ciency
Broad/None 0.21 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.49
0.21 0.46 0.45 0.41 0.50
Narrow/PISA 0.26 0.49 0.52 0.40 0.64
0.22 0.46 0.47 0.37 0.59
Intermediate/Regional 0.20 0.44 0.45 0.33 0.60
0.22 0.46 0.46 0.36 0.60
Bold entries are unweighted sample means. Plain entries are labor-force weighted sample means
Fortunately, it is also increasingly unnecessary. The increasing availability of rm
level data sets, particularly when matched with employee-level information (e.g. about
schooling), provides an opportunity to supplement the macro picture with microeconomic
productivity estimates comparable across countries.
The benet of producing such micro productivity estimates is by no means limited to
permitting to check the robustness of conclusions concerning average capital and e¢ ciency
gaps - though this benet alone is su¢ cient to make such exercises worthwhile. An ad-
ditional benet is to uncover information on the within country distribution of physical
capital, human capital, and e¢ ciency. A relatively concentrated distribution would sug-
gest that e¢ ciency gaps are mostly due to aggregate, macroeconomic factors that a¤ect
all rms fairly equally (e.g. impediment to technology di¤usion from other countries). A
very dispersed distribution, with some rms close to the world technology frontier, would
be more consistent with allocative frictions that prevent capital and labor to ow to the
more e¢ cient/talented managers.
More generally, rm-level data is likely to prove essential in the quest for the determi-
nants of the large e¢ ciency gaps revealed by the development-accounting calculation. After
all, (in-)e¢ ciency is by denition a rm-level phenomenon. Most of the most plausible
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possible explanations for the e¢ ciency gap are microeconomic in nature whether it is
about rms unable to adapt technologies developed in more technologically-advanced coun-
tries, failures in the market for managers and/or capital, frictions in the matching process
for workers, etc. It seems implausible that evidence for or against these mechanisms can be
found in the macro data. Yet understanding the sources of the Latin American e¢ ciency
gap is unquestionably the most urgent task for those who want to design policies aimed at
closing the Latin American income gap.
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